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Abstrat
Instead of positing seperate syntati mehanisms, we propose a single working meory meha-
nism that uniformly aounts for (i) a puzzle about topialization pointed out and explained in
the LFG literature, (ii) asymmetries in oordination struture observed and analyzed in various
syntati frameworks, and (iii) the eets of inserted phrases and pauses.
1 Introdution
As Chomsky (1957) made lear, natural language syntax annot be desribed solely in terms of linear
order (nite-state grammar); hierarhial struture plays a ruial role. However, that does not mean
that linear order has no role to play in our aounts of native (un)aeptability judgments. To say the
least, given that native judgments are results of real-time proessing, it would rather be surprising that
linear order had no eet on suh judgments. Thys, some researhers (e.g. Hawkins 1994) have attempted
to explain seemingly syntati phenomena in terms of real-time proessing.
In this paper we join suh a reent trend by making a spei proposal about linear order eets
and forumulate the proposal in terms of working memory. The struture of the paper is as follows. In
Setion 2, we illustrate the (un)aeptability judgments we intend to aount for; we point out that the
existing aounts fail to apture the observational generalization behind the onstrutions. In Setion
3, we propose a spei linear order aount, modeled in terms of working memory. In Setion 4, we
demonstrate that our proposal niely aounts for the phenomena in question. In Setion 5, we further
examine the nature of our proposal by suggesting an aount of a potential ounterexample. In Setion
6, we reets on what the merits of our aount is more preisely. Setion 7 onludes the paper.
2 Data and Problems
Kaplan and Bresnan (1982) pointed out the ontrast in (1), whih poses a problem (at least) for a
movement-based analysis of topialization. An obvious explanation for the ungrammatiality of (1a)
would be to assume that of annot take a that-lause as its omplement. This leads us t expet that top-
ialization of the that-lause does not alter the sentene's unaeptable status, an expetation surprisingly
betrayed by (1b).
(1) a.*John was thinking of that he was stupid.
b. That he was stupid, John was thinking of.
The solution proposed in the LFG literature (Kaplan and Zaenen 1989; Bresnan 2000; Falk 2001) ruially
relies on the LFG assumption that omplement seletion is stated in terms of grammatial funtion (GF),
instead of part of speeh (POS); the linking of GF and POS is stated by a separate onstraint. Putting
tehnial details aside, the gist of the proposed aount is that (i) while TOP (= topi) an be realized
as a CP, OBJ (= objet) annot; OBJ an only be realized as an NP, (ii) of selets OBJ, and (iii) the
syntati relation in (1b) between of and the topialized lause is stated in terms of GFs. (1a) is bad

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beause, in violation of (i), a that-lause attempts to realize OBJ, the GB seleted by of . In ontrast,
in (1b), the OBJ in question is not realized by an overt expression (no violation of (i)); indeed, the OBJ
value is the f-struture of the that-lause, but sine an f-struture ontains no POS information, this does
not violate (i).
1
However, suh aounts fail to predit the grammatiality dierenes in the following examples, whih
intuitively seem to be related to the pattern observed in (1). (4{d is from Quirk et al. (1995, x10.41),
ited from Yatabe(2004).)
2
(2) a. John was thinking of [Mary℄.
b.*John was thinking of [that he was stupid℄. (=(1a))
. John was thinking of [Mary℄ and [that he was stupid℄.
d.*John was thinking of [that he was stupid℄ and [Mary℄.
(3) a. Ken agreed with, but John denied, that Mike was wrong.
b.*John denied, but Ken agreed, with that Mike was wrong.
(4) a. Either she or you are/*is wrong.
b. Either your brakes or your eyesight is/?are at fault.
. Either your eyesight or your brakes are/?is at fault.
For example, given that (2{d) dier only in the order of the onjunts (whih are braketed), they should
have exatly the same f-struture, given the natural and standard LFG assumption that f-struture does
neet linear order. The GF-POS mapping is naturally not assumed to reet linear order, either. Thus,
an aount of (1) based on f-struture and GB-POS mappings annot be extended to the ontrast in
(2{d). Similarly for (3){(4), whih all share the pattern that the good and bad examples only dier with
respet to the order of the onjunts.
Observationally, it seems to us, the generalization is this: the head imposes its restrition (POS or
number/person agreement) on an argument near enough to it but not neessarily on an argument far
enough from it. In other words, only those arguments near enough to the head in linear order have to
satisfy the grammatial requirements imposed by the head. This intuitive generalization onvers (1){(4)
uniformly.
Suh an intuition itself is not neessarily new. For example, the agreement asymmetry in oordinate
struture as seen in sentenes suh as (4) is a rather old observation, and it is already assumed in the
literature (Sadok 1998; Moosally 1998; Yatabe 2004) that the head agrees only with nearer onjunts.An
exeption is Johannessen (1998), who analyzes a oordinate struture as the maximal projetion of the
1
For various alternative tehnial formulations of this proposal, see the referenes ited above.
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(2) is subsumed under this explanation only when () Mary and that he was stupid is analyzed as a on-
stituent; if () of Mary is a onstituent oordinated with the that-lause, (2) would simply be an ordinary
onstituent oordination whih poses no interesting problem. (We thank Shu^ihi Yatabe for pointing this out.)
However, onsider (i) and (ii).
i Sally missed Japan so muh she was thinking nostaligially of even eletion-vans and that rush-hour on the
Yamanote-line was not so bad as people make out.
ii *? Sally missed Japan so muh she was thinking nostalgially even that rush-hour on the Yamanote-line was
not so bad as people make out and eletion-vans.
In (i), even modies the NP and the that-lause, whih indiates that the NP and the that-lause form a on-
stituent, whih funtions as the omplement of of , thereby demonstrating that () is a possible analysis. Further,
the ontrast between (i){(ii) suggests that, even when the () analysis is fored, the linear order generalization is
observed; the inversion of the onjunts in (iii) degrades the grammatiality.
Of ourse, the badness of (ii) ould be a result of the mere fat that the left onjunt is too long and hene
plaes too muh burden on working memory, independently of our spei working memory model to be developed
below. However, even if we granted suh an argument and assumed that (2) is aepted only on the () parse,
(2a{d) would then only fail to support our proposal; they would not refute it anyway.
onjuntion, in whih the speier and the head agree (the Spe-Head agreement assumed in GB). In a
language like English in whih the speier always preedes the head, then, the rst onjunt should agree
with the head, whih agrees with its maximal projetion in turn, whih is diretly seleted by the head
and hene should satises the head's requirements. In short, this predits that, if there is an asymmetry
in a oordinate struture, it is the rst onjuts (but not the other onjunts) that obey the syntati
requirements imposed by the head seleting the oordinate struture, irrespetive of word order between
the head and the seleted oordinate struture. For example, it predits the opposite pattern for (4).
As far as we are aware, every other published work on oordinate struture asymmetries as well as our
own informant judgments are in onit with his predition. However, this observational generalization
has failed to be stated expliitly in their formalized theories; Sadok only mentions the observation, and
Moosally and Yatabe only stipulate agreement patterns on a ase-by-ase basis. And their aounts per se
are not meant to, and annot, over non-oordination sentenes suh as (1), on the other, thereby failing
to apture the similarity between (1) and (2){(4). It is not that they merely failed to notie the similarity
and to point out that their generalization also overs (1). Any existing non-LFG aount of unbounded
dependenies (either in HPSG assumed by Moosally or Yatabe, or any other framework we are aware of)
requires the syntati ategory of the ller to math the requirement imposed on the omplement by the
seleting head (P in this ase). Thus, unless one revises either one's treatment of unbounded dependeny
onstrutions (the syntati approah) or one's assumption of the role played by syntax in native speaker
judgments (the non-syntati approah), their aounts annot be extended to over (1).
The syntati approah would be an obvious ourse to take, but in this paper we dare take the non-
syntati approh. For one thing, manipulating syntati mehanisms for unbounded dependeny on-
strutions in non-linear order terms, as in LFG, would fail to apture the observational generalization of
linear order eets, and hene does not seem likely to sueed in giving a uniform treatment of (1) and
(2){(4). For another, the following examples lead us to suspet that the nature of the linear order eets
is rather not syntati:
(5) a.?Ken was thinking of, (pause) that he was stupid
b. Ken was thinking of, by the way, that he was stupid.
The observation is that the insertion of a pause improves the aeptability (5a), and the additional
insertion of by the way makes the sentene fully aeptable (5b). On the standard assumption, a pause
and by the way only aet real-time linear order, not syntax. But the observed pattern is, at least
intuitively, exatly the one we found for (1){(4); the syntati head of fails to exert its onstraints on its
omplement when the omplement beomes further from it. Thus, a syntati aount fails to apture
our intuitive generalization.
Let us restate our informal generalization as in (6).
(6) The Linear Order Eets (observation):
The syntati requirement the head imposes on an argument is eetive only to the extent that the
argument is \near enough" to the head in linear order.
Our task then is to larify the notion of \near enough."
3 The Working Memory Model
3.1 The General Idea
The leading idea behind our overall approah is that the Linear Order Eets (6) is a result of the need
for real-time proessing (parsing or generation by a human agent).
Firstly, it is already observed that, after hearing a sentene, the overall form of the sentene is easily lost
from memory, while the sementi ontent (in the sense of the prediate-argument struture) is retained
(Sahs 1967).
3
Indeed, there has to be some time interval in order for the overall form to get lost from
memory, but it at least suggests that the goal of parsing is to onstrut the semanti representation of
the sentene; syntati information is only a means to ahieve that goal. Then, it would not be totally
implausible to imagine that, while the overall form is retained in memory, more ner details of \syntati"
3
This information is due to Abe (1995).
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piees of information
4
suh as the head's POS requirements on of the sentene is more easily lost from
memory than the overall sentene form.
Seondly, real-time proessing proeeds \from left to right." Given that syntati onstitueny is
rather orthogonal to the left-to-right linear arrangement, real-time sentene proessing ruially relies on
short-term memory, or working memory, an assumption already assumed widely in the psyholinguisti
literature. Given that the apaity of working memory is severely limited, then, it would be rather
natural, and at least omputationally preferable, that useless information get \expelled" from working
memory as soon as possible.
These two observations lead us to the hypothesis that the ne-grained syntati information of a sub-
sentential expression is \expelled" from working memory even before the end of the sentene. At the point
when a given piee of syntati information is \expelled" from working memory, that piee fails to exerts
its inuene on the proessing of the remaining parts of the sentene, whih amounts to saying that the
relevant syntati onstraint loses its fore at that point. Our idea is to aount for the (un)aeptability
judgments observed above with this hypothesis.
Although this is not the right plae to disuss various models of working memory (or short term
memory), we assume that some sort of ativation model is orret. That is, to say that an item is in
working memory is to say that that item is ativated in a spei way. (That item might be an item
previously stored in long term memory before proessing the sentene in question or an item onstruted
on-line.) This assumption means that whether an item is in working memory or not is not a yes-no matter
but rather a matter of degree; omletely \expelled" items (or those items not put in working memory in
the rst plae) have the ativation value of zero, ompletely ative items have the full ativation value,
and there are also those items whose ativation values are somewhere in between.
3.2 The Spei Details
Having illustrated the overall general idea, we now speify the details of our model, in a step by step
fashion.
3.2.1 Adjaeny
Assume that a pharse (maximal projetion) P
1
(here, oneived as a node) is seleted by a phrasal
head P
2
, whih should ome after P
1
. One the proessor has sueeded in onstruting P
1
, P
2
an be
immediately onstruted, on a \look ahead" basis, before atually enountering those words that are
(or turn out to be) parts of P
2
. At this point, P
2
is onstruted in working memory, with syntati
information fully onsistent with the requirements imposed by P
1
.
Next, assume that a lexial head L selets, and hene imposes some syntati information on, a phrase
P
2
that should ome after L. In suh a ase, too, one the proessor has proessed L it an immediately
onstrut P
2
on a \look ahead" basis, whih we assume the proessor does. Thus, at this point, P
2
is put
in working memory, with syntati information fully onsistent with the requirements imposed by L.
Whihever is the ase, the next inoming words should ideally be those whih are parts of P
2
; otherwise,
the proessor's expetation is betrayed, the attention is detrated from P
2
, and hene, the syntati
information on P
2
is deativated, given the limited apaity of working memory.
Thus, in both ases, P
2
should ideally be adjaent to P
1
or L; otherwise, the syntati onstraint
C ditated by the grammar on P
2
will fail to exert its (full) eet on the proessing of the sentene,
where the (un)aeptability judgment is a result of proessing. In other words, the \degree of adjaeny"
inuenes aeptability judgments (given that it makes sense of the \degree of adjaeny"): the further
P
2
is from P
1
or L, the less severe the violations of C.
3.2.2 Syntax vs. Semantis
Our general idea is that ontents in working memory is ativated only to the degree they are useful for
the onstrution of the semanti ontent, here understood as the prediate-argument struture. Thus,
what we mean by the term \syntati" above should be understood as \whatever information is not
part of the prediate-argument struture." For example, the phonologial ontent is learly not part
of the prediate-argument struture and hene is \syntati" in the sense used here. Similarly for the
4
By the term \syntati" here we mean whatever ne aspets of grammar that are not part of the nal produt
of parsing: the semanti representation (prediate-argument struture). In the remainder of the paper, this term
is used in this sense unless speied otherwise.
information onerning number and person agreement, even if one assumes that agreement information
is part of semantis, not syntax.
5
3.2.3 The Deativation Degrees
We have thus far proposed that the \degree of adjaeny" determines the degree of deativation.
Usually, the term \adjaeny" is understood as a yes-no matter, with no gray zone. However, given that
the observed adjaeny eets are a result of the deativation in working memory, it will be natural to
talk about the \degree of adjaeny."
Now, what does it mean for two items I
1
and I
2
not to be adjaent? It means that some other item I
3
intervenes between I
1
and I
2
. Thus, our thinking leads to the onlusion that the degree of non-adjaeny
is just the degree to whih the intervening item I
3
deativates the syntati information on I
2
.
With all those bakgrounds, the observed (un)aeptability judgments an be explained in a uniform
manner if something like the following deativation rate assignment is assumed, where 1.0 is the \fully
ativated" level, 0.0 is the fully deativated (or \expelled") level, and the eets of the presene of
intervening elements are additive:
 While proessing I
3
, where I
3
is a maximal projetion argument, 1.0 is subtrated from the ativation
level of the syntati information on I
1
and I
2
.
 While proessing I
3
, where I
3
is a maximal projetion adjunt, 0.3 is subtrated.
 While proessing I
3
, where I
3
is a pause, 0.3 is subtrated.
 If the result of a subtration beomes less than zero, it ounts as zero.
In the next setion we demonstrate that this model suessfully aounts for the observed (un)aeptability
judgments in a uniform manner.
4 Demonstrations
In this setion we demonstrate that the above model suessfully aounts for the judgments in question
in a uniform manner, but before proeeding, a word about the theory of grammar is in order.
A proessor is a devie that onstruts linguisti representations using the knowledge of grammar.
Thus, the preise behavior of a proessor depends on the theory of grammar. In our demonstration, we
have HPSG in mind as the theory of grammar. However, our reliane on the spei arhiteture of
HPSG is minimal, and we believe that our model an be implemented on other grammatial frameworks
alike.
6
4.1 Coordination
The observed generalization is that the head agrees with the losest onjunt, where the term \agree" is
meant to over both number/person agreement and POS requirements. We examine the POS require-
ments on omplements and the number/person agreement on subjets, in that order.
4.1.1 Compelement Coordination
The relevant examples (2a{d) are repeated here as (7):
(7) a. John was thinking of Mary.
b.*John was thinking of that he was stupid.
. John was thinking of Mary and that he was stupid.
d.*John was thinking of that he was stupid and Mary.
We assume that of in these examples requires an NP omplement, as indiated by (7b). The generalization
is that, given a onguration of the form:
5
There is good evidene that number agreement sometimes aets the propositional ontent of the sentene, a
favorite topi for one of us (for example, see Ishikawa 1998). However, the question of whether number agreement
is semanti or syntati (in the usual sense of the term) is a thorny and ompliated question. We avoid a
disussion of it and simply assume that it is not part of the semanti ontent (the prediate-argument struture),
an assumption widely held in the GB/MP literature.
6
The ruial features of HPSG we reply upon will be noted in footnotes.
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V [
X
Y and Z ℄
only P
1
, the rst or losest onjunt, is required to obey the syntati requirement imposed by V.
7
Immediately enountering V, the proessor onstruts Y . At this point, the proessor does not know
yet
8
that the omplement of V is a oordinated phrase, and hene, there is no point in positing X or Z.
The inoming words are analyzed as parts of Y (Figure 1).
The syntati requirements imposed by V on Y are fully ative, and the POS of the rst onjunt Y
has to math the requirement by V. Hene the unaeptability of (7d).
VP
V Y
Figure 1: The initial partial tree
VP
V X
Y Z
Figure 2: The modied partial tree
In ontrast, upon enountering the onjuntion (in this ase, and), the proessor has to modify the
already onstruted struture to something like Figure 2. X here is a newly onstruted node here.
However, at this point, 1.0 is subtrated from the ativation level of the subategorization information
of V (=I
1
), while proessing the argument phrase Y (=I
3
).
9
This means that the subategorization
requirement fails to be imposed on X and hene Z; hene the aeptability of (7b).
The examples in (3a{b) reeive a similar aount.
4.1.2 Subjet Coordination
The relevant examples (4) are repeated here as (8):
(8) a. Either she or you are/*is wrong.
b. Either your brakes or your eyesight is/?are at fault.
. Either your eyesight or your brakes are/?is at fault.
Here we ignore the presene of the expressions either and or .
10
In (8a), I
2
is the VP node. First, assume that I
1
is the rst onjunt, she. Immediately after proessing
she, the proessor does not know yet that it gets oordinated with another NP. Thus, it onstruts a
VP node, with the third person singular agreement information. However, while proessing the seond
onjunt you (=I
3
), whih is an argument, 1.0 is subtrated from the ativation level of this agreement
information on the VP node. Thus, third person singular agreement is not imposed on the VP node
anymore. Also note that the agreement information on the rst onjunt (=I
1
) has also deayed at this
point. On the other hand, at this point the mother node has to be onstruted for the oordinate subjet.
The seond onjunt has just been onstruted, and hene, its seond person agreement information is
still ative in working memory. Hene, the mother node for the oordinate subjet bears the seond
person agreement speiation, hene the seond person agreement on the VP and hene the head V.
A similar aount applies to (8b{).
11
7
Here we follow HPSG and most other syntati frameworks (but not LFG) in assuming that a lexial head
imposes POS requirements on its omplements.
8
In this paper the proessor is assumed to be a parser.
9
Here we are using the term \argument" in the sense that it is a semanti argument. It may or may not be
an argument in the syntati sense, depending on one's preise analysis of the syntax of oordination, whih is
beyond the sope of this paper.
10
We disuss these expressions in a footnote, after giving the general idea of how our model works.
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Speaking preisely, this is not the ase, sine in (8b{), we observe that agreement with the rst onjunts
does not produe full unaeptability, whih the above aounts predit.
We suspet that this ompliation is related to the presene of the expressions either and or . While the
proper syntati analysis of the either ... or onstrution is not at yet lear, one possible line of analysis would
be one in terms of Constrution Grammar, of whih HPSG an be seen as an instane. If the general idea of
Constrution Grammar is assumed, it is plausible that the pharase either X or Y is stored in long term memory
as an underspeied phrase, whih is put in working memory as it is. This would signiantly ompliate the
story, depending on whether suh a onstrution ounts as an argument or an adjunt. We suspet that the mild
unaeptability in question is due to suh ompliation, but we have to leave this issue to future researh.
4.2 Topialization
The relevant examples (1a{b) are repeated here as (9a{b):
(9) a.*John was thinking of that he was stupid.
b. That he was stupid, John was thinking of.
In (9a), of is I
1
, whih onstruts an NP node by \look ahead"; the subategorization requirement
of the P imposed on its omplement is fully ative. Thus, the proessor expets an NP, an expetation
betrayed here; hene the unaeptability.
In ontrast, in (9b), things are radially dierent. Immediately after onstruting the topi phrase
node (=I
1
), the proessor onstruts an S node by \look ahead." However, the proessor next has to
onstrut the subjet NP, and then the VP node, and then the PP node, before reahing the P of . At
least the NP and the PP are arguments. Thus, while onstuting these nodes, the ativation level of the
topi phrase is fully deativated and hene the part-of-speeh information is no longer aessible. Hene
the full aeptability of (9b).
4.3 Insertion
The relevant examples are repeated here:
(10) a.?Ken was thinking of, (pause) that he was stupid
b. Ken was thinking of, by the way, that he was stupid.
In (5a), a pause (=I
3
) in inserted between of (=I
1
) and the node for the that-phrase (=I
2
). Aording
to our mode, when atually enountering the words omprising the that-lause, the syntati information
on I
1
and I
3
have hanged from 1.0 to 0.7 (=1.0-0.3), hene the degraded status of (5a).
In (5b), there are three intervening elements, the inserted phrase by the way (whih is an adjunt)
and the two pauses surrounding it. Eah element substrat .3 from the ativation level of I
1
and I
3
, the
additive result is .9 subtration (.9=.3times3), whih we assume is large enough and an be equated with
1.0 subtration.
12
This means that the syntati requirement imposed by of is eetively erased from
working memeory, and (5b) is orretly predited to be fully aeptable.
5 Semanti Constraints
One interesting observation is provided by Bayer (1996), who observes that despite rejets a that-lause
omplement, even when the lause is a non-rst onjunt seperated from it by some other onjunt(s).
(11) a. Despite [LaToya's intransigene℄, Mihel signed the ontrat. (NP)
b. Despite [the fat [that all the musiians quit℄℄, Mihel signed the ontrat. (NP)
.*Despite [that all the musiian quit℄, Mihel signed the ontras. (that-lause)
d.*Despite [LaToya's intransigene℄ and [that all the musiian quit℄, Mihel signed the ontrat. (NP
onjoined with that-lause)
This suggests that the onstraint that despite imposes on its omplement does not follow the pattern
ditated by our model.
13
We mention this possible ounterexample in order to illustrate more preisely
the nature of our model. We point out that this is not a ounterexample to our model if a semanti
analysis along the line suggested here is aepted.
12
We ould alter the degree of subtration in the previous setion from .3 to
1
3
without aeting the story at
all, in whih ase the predition is 1.0 subtration.
13
This leads one to wonder how the requirements imposed by despite manifest in suh extration onstrutions
as topialization. However, as Huddlston, Pullum and Peterson (2002) point out, despite does not allow extration
of its omplement in the rst plae:
i *Here is a list of the objetors, [that they went ahead [despite ℄℄.
and thus we annot examine whether it follows the patter or not in extration onstrutions.
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5.1 Contentfull and Contentless Prepositions
It is rather an old observation in the HPSG literature that English Prepositions have two kinds: those
prediative Preposition with semanti ontent (P[+PRD℄ in the usual HPSG treatment), and those whih
only serve as a sort of ase marker and hene are without semanti ontent (P[-PRD℄). For example, in
(12), the rst for is a mere \ase marker" with no semanti ontent, whereas the seond for does have
semanti ontent and says that the omplement's referent is the person who is to benet from Ken's
behavior:
(12) Ken is waiting for Naomi for me.
The observation that despite does not follow the pattern ditated by our model and exhibited by of in
(1) and (2) is, we laim, due to the fat that the former is a ontentful P[+PRD℄ while the latter is a
ontentless P[-PRD℄.
Let us assume that only ontentful heads an (but do not neessarily have to) impose semanti restri-
tions on their omplements. Thus, despite imposes semanti restritions on its omplement, while of in
question does not. But what kinds of semanti restritions are imposed by despite?
5.2 Seletion Restritions and the Classiations of Events
A lassial argument against the possibility of giving a semanti aount of the so-alled Complex NP
Constraint is that, while a mere that-lause allows extration from an element inside it, a supposedly
synonymous omplex NP the fat that ... does not. Putting aside the issue of how observations that
motivate the Complex NP Constraint should be aounted for, this argument is learly invalid. Various
nouns other than fat an take a that-lause omplement, as in:
(13) the fat/rumour/laim/... that ...
Thus, the natural assumption is that a bare that-lause is neutral as to whether it expresses a fat, a
rumour, or a laim, et. (f. Asher 1993). Let us all the distintion between a fat, a rumour, a laim,
et, P-SORT (short for \proposition sort"). Hene, a bare that-lause is not synonymous, for they dier
with respet to P-SORT.
The above observation an be expressed in at least the following two ways:
 The P-SORT of a bare that-lause is underspeied.
 The P-SORT of a bare that-lause is nil , a speial sort that is distint from those sorts suh as fat ,
rumour , laim, et.
If things are formulated in HPSG, in whih ase P-SORT will be adopted as a semanti feature whose
possible values inlude fat (and possibly nil), the former analysis means that the value an unify with
any sort (it only says that the grammar imposes no onstraint on the value):
(14)

SYNSEM jCONT jP-SORT
h i

while the latter means that the grammar onstrains the value to be distint from any other sort suh as
fat , rumour , or laim:
(15)
h
SYNSEM jCONT jP-SORT nil
i
Both analyses ould be formulated in HPSG, but if we hoose the latter (i.e. the relevant portion of
the feature struture of a that-lause is as desribed in (15) and assume that despite seletionally restrits
its omplement to be [SYNSEMjCONTjPSORT : nil℄, our model makes the orret preditions, where
we assume that the lexial entry for fat is partially desribed in Figure 3:
When it takes a that-lause omplement, the lause unies with 2 , whih struture-shares the P-SOA
value 3 with the head noun fat . In other words, the propositional ontent is \inherited" from the
that-lause omplement to the head noun fat , and hene to the whole NP the fat that .... On the
other hand, the that-lause omplement and the head noun fat have distint P-SORT values: fat and
nil . That is, the propositional sort is not inherited. Thus, while a bare that-lause bears the [P-SORT
nil℄ speiation and hene rejeted by despite, suh an NP as the fat that ... bears the [P-SORT fat℄
26
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2
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
HEAD N
COMPS h 2 i

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
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t
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
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
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
P-SORT nil
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
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Figure 3: A partial desription of the lexial entry of fat
speiation, whih suessfully unies with the [P-SORT :nil℄ requirement imposed by despite, and
hene an suessfully ombines with it.
The assumption that despite requires a non-nil omplement is a reetion of the intuition that the
omplement of despite has to denote something whih is already established and somehow presupposed.
For example, in (16a), the fat that the ontent of the that-lause is a rumour/laim et. is already
established and presupposed:
(16) a. despite the rumour/laim that ...
b. *despite that ...
In ontrast, in (16b), only the P-SOA (the propositional ontent) is stated. The propositional ontent is
expressed even by an imperative, and hene, by itself does not establish anything. This is the ause of
the unaeptability.
In short, we suggest that the real generalization is not that despite rejets a non-NP omplement but
rather that it rejets a omplement whih resists a fative (or presuppositional) reading. Indeed, many
NPs allow a fative interpretation in this ontext, and hene, the inherent fativitity is not in question.
Rather, it rejets an expression that annot be interpreted as an already established fat. Our hoie of
assigning the nil as the P-SORT value to a bare that-lause, instead of simply underspeifying it, reets
this observation.
5.3 The Survival of Semanti Constraints
Remember the intuitive idea behind our model: the requirement imposed by a linguisti item on another
item deays in working memory to the extent that it has nished playing its role for the onstrution of
the semanti ontent. This means that semanti onstraints should survive, irrespetive of word order;
they survive even after the proessing of the whole sentene is well nished.
This in turn means that the semanti onstraint imposed by despite survives, no matter what the
linear order is. That is, it requires a omplement whose P-SORT value is not nil . This is why a bare
that-lause is not allowed even as a seond onjunt, given that a semanti requirement imposed on a
oordinate struture distributes to eah of its onjunt.
14
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Shu^ihi Yatabe (p..) points out that a bare that-lause is sometimes interpreted as a fat:
(i) a. [That John was drunk at that time℄ aused traÆ aident.
b. [The fat [that John was drunk at that time℄℄ aused traÆ aident.
. [That John won the lotto℄ surprised his girlfriend.
d. [The rumor [that John won the lotto℄℄ surprised his girlfriend.
In (ia) and (i), it does make sense that the subjet is interpreted as a fat. We an point out that the verbs
require the subjets to be interpreted as fats. On the other hand, the subjets in (ib) and (id) presuppose that
the ontent of the that-lause is a fat or rumor. That suh a fativitity presupposition is operative is suggested
by the degraded status of (ii):
ii ?[That John might won the lotto℄ surprised his girlfriend.
However, this suggests that a bare that-lause sometimes does allow a \fat" interpretation, i.e. as a [P-SORT
fat℄ phrase, an observation rather in onit with the aount illustrated in the main text. A disussion of this
onit is left for future researh.
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6 Disussion
Our model suessfully gives a uniform aount of the observed (un)aeptability judgments, but the
suess partially owes to the prie we have paid: the stipulation of numerial degrees of deativation. We
have deided the numerial degrees so that our model would give the orret preditions for (5a{b). To
the extent that the numerial speiations have no independent evidene, our aount of (5a{b) ould
be alled a mere paraphrase of the observed degrees of unaeptability, or a translation of the observation
to a desription in terms of working memory.
However, while a mere observation makes no further empirial prediations, our \paraphrase" or \trans-
lation" denitely does. Indeed, we have not onrmed the preditions at this point. However, a model
or theory whih makes unexpeted empirial preditions indiates a future researh agenda and hene is
fruitful, we assume.
In this setion, we rst point out that our aount makes at least one further, independent prediation.
And then we onlude this setion with a somewhat speulative remark.
6.1 Phonologial Priming
The oneptual justiation for our assumption that \syntati" information deays in working memory
is that the goal of proessing a sentene is to produe a semanti representation, and hene, it is ostly
to keep an item ative in working memory even after it has beome useless and is something that a
human proessor is likely to avoid. This predits that phonologial information beomes deativated too
(possibly even before purely syntati information beomes deativated).
This predition ould be empirially tested. A word is known to ause various priming eets. For
example, assume you assign a lexial deision task to the subjets in a ontrolled experimental setting
15
and measured the response time (RT). The RT for the test word (alled the target) beomes faster if
you had presented another word (alled the prime) that has a lose semanti relation with the test word
beforehand, than if you hadn't, in whih ase you have observed a(n) (indiret) semanti priming eet.
A similar priming eet, alled a(n) (indiret) phonologial priming eet, is observed when the prime
and the target resemble phonologially to eah other. The usual assumption is that suh a priming eet
is observed only while the relevant semanti or phonologial information is ative in working memory.
Thus, if our model is orret, we naturally expet not only that phonologial priming eets disappear
more rapidly than semanti priming eets but also that the disappearane rates of phonologial priming
eets orrelate with the degree of the failure for the relevant syntati onstraints to manifest their
eets.
Although we have not atually onrmed or disonrmed these preditions, the numerial assignments
in our model are not mere paraphrases of the observations to the exent that they make suh independent
preditions.
6.2 Timing vs. Overt Lingusiti Materials
In visual and auditory pereptions, the stimulus is often oluded by irrelevant noise, in whih ase the
ability to restore those parts missing from the stimulus (or to reonstrut the whole shape of the original
stimulus based on the observed parts) is ruial for the survival of the agent. However, two ases should
be distinguished: those ases in whih some parts are simply missing, and those ases whih the missing
parts are replaed with some \noise." Automati pereptual restoration ours only in the latter ase.
For example, a sequene of disrete pure tones seperated by silent intervals is pereived as just that, a
series of pure tones and silent intervals (no restoration). However, if an appropriate white noise is inserted
into eah silent interval, suddenly it is pereived as one ontinuous pure tone with white noises imposed
on it (restoration).
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The distintion between the two ases an be understood as a distintion between the absene of the
expeted material (a pure tone) and the presene of something unexpeted (a white noise). Thus under-
stood, the distintion begins to sound relevant to our disussion of the linear order eets. In sentene
proessing, the distintion orresponds to the distintion between (A) the absene of the expeted expres-
sion and (B) the presene of an unexpeted expression. But what ounts as an \(un)expeted"expression?
15
A lexial deision task is a task to deide whether the presented stimulus \word" is a real word in your native
language or a fake word that in fat is not part of your language.
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See (and hear) Bregman (1990) and Bregman and Ahad (1996) for demonstrations and disussions of various
visual and auditory restorations, inluding this one. The well-known Phoneme Restoration Eet an be seen as
a subspeies of this.
In our present model, the presene of a pause and the presene of an adjunt are assumed to have
the same numerial eet, as opposed to the presene of an argument. If a pause does not ount as an
\unexpeted expression," no parallelism ould be pointed out betwen our present model and the above
observation in visual and auditory pereption. If we want to seek for some non-trivial parallelism, we
would have to assume that a pause does ount as an \unexpted expression."
Of ourse, we are not saying that the observations in perpetual psyhology and our own disussion
of the linear order eets are ompletely parallel. (Denitely we are not dealing with \restoration.")
However, if our present model is on the right trak, it suggests that a pause has a similar status as an
overt linguisti expression suh as an argument or an adjunt.
Note that we are not advoating that a pause should be oneived as a linguisti expression in the
narrow sense (an empty ategory); a pause is only a silent time interval. Rather, the suggestion is that
a time interval does make a dierene, whih is known to be the ase in phoneti peeption.
For example, suppose that an in (17a) is pronouned with a stress on it, in whih ase the vowel
beomes indistinguishable from that in an't in (17b) ([℄ in Amerian English, as opposed to a shwa).
(17) a. I an do it. [kn℄
b. I an't do it. [knt℄
Cruially, [t℄ in (17b) is not released and hene fails to exhibit a burst, and beause of the presene of
[d℄ immediately following it, its presene or absene annot be distinguished on the basis of the formant
transition of the following vowel. Thus, in suh a ase, (17a{b) annot be distinguished on the basis of
the presene or absene of [t℄. Rather, they are pereived dierently beause of the presene of a silent
interval between [n℄ and [d℄ in (17b) that is not found in (17a).
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If our model is on the right trak, it suggests that the presene of a mere time interval exhibits an
eet not only in phoneti pereption but also in (un)aeptability judgments. If our reasoning is orret,
the reason is obvious: both are something done in real-time. Real-time proessing is, by denition,
ruially time-dependent, and it would be rather surprising that information onerning time would
exhibit no eet in human speeh behavior in real time, subspeies of whih are phoneti pereption
and (un)aeptability judgments. This suggests that lingusits should pay more attention to real-time
proessing than they have done.
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7 Conlusion
In this paper we have proposed a spei working memory model to aount for the (un)aeptablity
judgments. The merit of our proposal argued for in this paper is that it gives a uniform aount of
the observed judgements, instead of formulating a seperate (syntati) mehanism to aount for eah
observation. Indeed, its further predition is yet to be (dis)onrmed, and various tehnial details are
yet to be rened. However, if it is on the right trak, our approah suggests that linguists should pay more
attention to the fat that (un)aeptability judgments are a result of real-time proessing and hene is not
immune to the working of the human proessor. A seemingly grammatial phenomena is not neessarily
grammatial.
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